One of the biggest obstacles to recycling consumer goods is the high cost of material separation. The recovered value from recycling increases as the disassembly of the discarded product is easier. For example, recovery of high-value reusable components from a car, television set or cell phone may be too labor-intensive, making recycling companies forgo that option and simply "grind the product" to recover less valuable raw materials such as steel, precious metals or plastic instead of more valuable components. At the same time, competitive pressures force firms to differentiate their products when competing for consumers. Such differentiation is accrued through, e.g., product design and material selection choices that are different from competitors. Product differentiation leads thus to waste streams that are more diverse in terms of aggregate material stream composition, which is much more difficult to separate and, hence, increases the recycling costs. One approach would be to recycle products at the level where they are more homogeneous, i.e., at the firm level. The second big obstacle to recycling are economies of scale. Significant set-up costs are often required to set a recycling infrastructure (e.g., to set up collection sites, to certify the processes of participating recyclers, to administer financial flows between consumers, manufacturers and recyclers, …). Therefore, when firms compete with differentiated products, they may not have enough volume to make recycling break even. It is then natural that intermediate structures have been proposed: keeping the material flows as homogeneous as possible (the firm level), in order to keep (variable) separation costs low, and yet keeping the volumes high enough to leverage economies of scale. This can be achieved via "recycling coalitions". As historically governments bore the brunt of the disposal costs, they have been active in proposing new structures in order to reduce their financial burden and to have companies be responsible for the proper disposal of the products they bring to the market.
As early as 2002, the European Union led a way to collect, recycle and recover electrical and electronic products through the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive, which imposes the responsibility for disposing of e-waste on its manufacturers. It has become European law and has been implemented in all EU member countries by now. To implement the WEEE Directive, governmental legislators compel or induce manufacturers to endogenously join Producer Compliance Schemes (PCS). As a result, we observe PCS's within different scopes. At the EU level, the European Recycling Platform (ERP) is "the only pan-European scheme delivering WEEE compliance" (http://www.erp-recycling.co.uk/index.php?content=87). In EU membership states, producers are required to join at least one of the PCS's based on different legislations. For example, in Netherlands, producers join one of the three compliance schemes: NVMP (Household), ICT (IT), and Stickting Lightrec (Lighting); in UK, there are over 40 schemes: Valpak, REPIC, etc. (Implementation of the Waste Electric and Electronic Equipment Directive in the EU). In the US, similar legislation as the WEEE has not been approved by the federal government yet, but 25 states have passed legislation requiring statewide recycling of e-waste (http://www.electronicstakeback.com/promote-good-laws/state-legislation/). For instance, Texas has passed computer takeback law in 2007 which requires manufacturers that sell new computer equipment in Texas to offer consumers a free and convenient recycling program; in 2011, they passed a similar law for TV manufacturers (Texas Commission on Environmental Quality). At the federal level and in different states, weaker legislation is pending. However, given the current political agenda and growing awareness of the environmental impact of electronic goods, one may expect that stronger laws will be discussed in the near future in the US. Moreover, some global manufacturers, such as HP, who capture both European and US markets have environmentally friendly corporate culture, so they are guided by similar environmental guidelines in the two markets. Together with consumers' expectation, all the above factors put societal pressures on emanufacturers in the US, pushing more and more e-manufacturers to become more responsible for the proper (i.e., environmentally friendly) disposal of the goods they bring to the markets. A question that emerges here is, are the manufacturers adopting similar environment-related business strategies in the two markets?
In Europe, most TV manufacturers, such as Sony and Samsung, join the ERP in compliance with the implementation of the WEEE in local markets; that is, all manufacturers have to pay for recycling. Therefore, an obvious advantage of joining the ERP is sharing of recycling resources such as reverse logistics and reduction of related costs. However, not all firms are attracted by the benefits rising from the ERP: Panasonic, which captures the markets in 17 countries of Europe and also complies with the WEEE, has independent product takeback system, EcologyNet Europe; similarly, Sharp has its independent recycling program as well, which is called Europe Sharp. To summarize, the European TV recycling market consists of one large manufacturers' alliance and several independent manufacturers.
In the US, the composition of the recycling market is even more complicated: 1) Toshiba, Panasonic, Sanyo, Mitsubishi, Sharp, and Vizio founded MRM, an electronic Manufacturers Recycling Management company; 2) Sony and LG joined the Waste Management, a general purpose recycling company; and 3) Samsung uses its private recycling system. One of the reasons for this structure is the lack of universal governmental legislations. For example, due to the existence of producer responsibility law, the fund for recycling in MRM comes from participating manufacturers. Therefore, members join this alliance in order to share related costs: every firm pays an annual registration fee for recycling products in each state, and the alliance set up reverse logistics in those states. According to different laws and manufacturers' market shares in different states, this registration fee is fixed in several states and usually depends on the manufacturer's market share (as discussed in Gui et al., 2012) .
Beyond the WEEE, a more specific legislation is the End of Life Vehicles (ELV) Directive of the European Union, which particularly addresses the environmental impact of automotive products through their life cycles. At the end-of-life stage, the ELV claims the requirement to vehicle collection, reuse, recycling and recovery. An outstanding implementation is the Automotive Recycling Netherlands (ARN), a consortium of all car importers in Netherlands. The ARN coordinates a network of: 1) drop-off points for used cars, where the cars are (manually) dismantled (according to standard procedures) into steel, rubber, glass, batteries, seats, etc. and 2) specialized recyclers that aggregate material streams from different dismantlers and recycle these materials (e.g. rubber into playground mats, steel into steel, etc.). Compared with other products, motor vehicles are more difficult and costly to recycle, both in volumes and product complexity: removing parts, dismantling and shredding. For example, dismantling many different types of cars from different brands correctly requires knowledge of the Bill-of-Materials of the cars. As the latter are constantly evolving and owned by the manufacturers, simply knowing which materials are used and how they are put together is a major challenge (Dahmus and Gutowski, 2007) . Furthermore, dismantling a luxury Mercedes with a seamlessly integrated interior design is much more challenging than dismantling, for example, a Tata Nano. The ARN is also responsible for financing;
i.e., it manages a fund that is supplied by a tax paid when a new car is purchased, and is used to cover recycling costs.
Thus, besides the fixed costs of establishing recycling networks, due to labor intensive disassembly of complex, differentiated products, variable costs have also become significant. For example, if different materials are used by firms to differentiate themselves in the primary markets, adequately separating these materials involves more labor or other technologies that are hard to automate. Variable costs of firms producing near identical products on the primary market will be much lower; however, competition on the primary market will be tougher.
Our objective is to study the drivers, fixed cost savings vs. variable cost increases, of endogenous coalition formation and the impact of such coalitions on the social welfare (environmental impact, firms' profits, and consumer surplus).
We refer to the problem of maximizing the social welfare as the Social Problem (SP), and use it as a benchmark for our model. In this model, for a given industry structure (number of firms, degree of differentiation) and cost structure (fixed and variable costs of recycling), the social planner determines the number of recycling coalitions and production volumes that maximize the total surplus generated (consumer utility minus recycling costs). In practice, the legislator cannot always implement the solution of SP, and we additionally study two commonly adopted recycling approaches: the Responsibility Problem (RP) and the Externality Problem (EP). For the RP problem, firms first form endogenously recycling coalitions and then compete in the primary market with each other. The RP mimics the situation in which the legislator allows the industry to set up infrastructure to ensure proper disposal, after EPR legislation is introduced. For example, as the implementation of the WEEE Directive, a PCS in UK is a manufacturers' coalition, in which (1) producers are charged for both fixed service fees (economies of scale) and fees for collection, treatment, recovery and recycling (by quantity), (2) producers can establish individual PCS, and (3) producers can change membership (Government Guidance, http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file54145.pdf). For the EP problem, which mimics the situation before any EPR legislation is introduced, firms compete with each other in the primary market, ignoring all costs related to disposal and then, a government sets up a recycling network to dispose properly the products that the firms brought to the market, minimizing the total recycling costs.
Preview of results.
From the social planner's perspective, even when all firms are equal ex ante (that is, there is no dominating firm), it is not always the case that a symmetric market structure (i.e. with alliances of similar size) dominates. This is due to the impact of the variable costs on the size of the recycling channel. When the variable recycling costs increase fast in the coalition size, it is optimal for the social planner to create some small and one large recycling channels. When the variable recycling costs increase slowly, then, a symmetric market structure will maximize the social welfare. The question that we address in this work is: when coalitions are formed endogenously, will these also exhibit similar qualitative features?
Our results indicate that in the EP model we usually observe symmetric alliances, while in the RP model we can see both asymmetric and symmetric alliances, depending on the parameters' values. We also study the impact of the use of taxes and subsidies on the improvement of the results obtained in the EP and RP model (that is, under what conditions can we achieve the outcomes from the SP model, and if this is not possible, under what conditions EP or RP model performs better).
